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ABSTRACT 
Using multiple longitudinal case studies of young biotechnology firms, we study differences 
in the financing process between high and low performing firms. Findings suggest that initial 
differences in the specialization of the investors with whom entrepreneurs affiliate early on, 
affect the ease with which firms attract (specialized) follow-on financing and firm 
performance. We demonstrate the role of the social context in shaping initial financing 
outcomes, as entrepreneurs limit their search for financing to one or a few investors with 
whom they have pre-existing ties. Additionally, our research provides a dynamic view of the 
financing process. We identify isolating mechanisms, including entrepreneurial learning and 
homophily and network considerations in investor syndication, which limit entrepreneurs 
when trying to adopt successful financing strategies implemented by competitors later on. A 
core contribution is that we theorize on evolutionary processes in the financing process. This 
new perspective advances our knowledge on dynamics in the financing process and opens 
multiple avenues for future research. 
 
Key words: entrepreneurship; new venture finance; financing process; venture capital; 
performance 
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INTRODUCTION 
Why and how do firms differ in their conduct? Why do they perform differently? 
These are some of the most fundamental questions that lie at the very core of business 
management and strategy research (Nelson, 1991). Recent studies suggest that the financing 
process is one of the key external prompts initiating differences in development between high 
and low performing entrepreneurial firms (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Maurer & Ebers, 2006). 
It is proposed that the financing process influences the structure and experience of the 
management team (Beckman & Burton, 2008) and initiates changes in how firms arrange and 
reconfigure their social capital (Maurer & Ebers, 2006) amongst other. Despite its importance, 
our understanding of the characteristics of the entrepreneurial financing process causing 
differences in performance between firms remains limited.  
Researchers have extensively examined different financing decisions, such as whether 
a firm will raise debt or equity (see Harris & Raviv, 1991 for an overview), public or private 
finance (Denis & Mihov, 2003), bank debt or trade credit (Nilsen, 2002) and bank debt or 
venture capital financing (Ueda, 2004). The majority of prior research, however, focuses on 
the type of financing raised and builds on two competing theoretical frameworks, namely the 
static trade-off theory1 and pecking order theory2 (Fama & French, 2005; Frank & Goyal, 
2005; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999; Myers, 1984). While prior research focuses on the 
differences between these two theoretical frameworks, they typically ignore the similarities. 
As a result, much of the literature on the financing process rests on a few common 
assumptions. 
First, financial theories assume that entrepreneurs are economically rational. Economic 
rationality implies that entrepreneurs make financing decisions in such a way that wealth is 
maximized (Myers, 1984). In the case of young entrepreneurial firms, additional goals and 
constraints have been identified, such as the willingness to remain independent and keep 
control over the business (Sapienza, Korsgaard, & Forbes, 2003) and knowledge about 
financing alternatives (Van Auken, 2001).  
                                               
 
1
 The static trade-off theory posits that firms will trade-off the benefits of debt (i.e. tax benefits) against the costs of debt 
financing (i.e. bankruptcy costs). Firms will raise financing across time in such a way that an optimal target capital structure 
is obtained (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Titman, 1984). 
 
2
 The pecking order theory posits that firms will rank financing alternatives, because of asymmetric information, and the 
resulting underpricing. Firms will prefer internal funds, if internal funds are insufficient they will raise debt financing and 
they will only raise external equity as a last resort (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). In a pecking order framework, firms 
have no target capital structure and financing decisions merely dependent on the availability of internal funds and access to 
debt financing at the time (Myers, 1984). 
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Furthermore, once entrepreneurs have decided to attract outside financing it is 
assumed that they will explore the entire range of investors and investors have access to the 
entire pool of firms willing to raise external financing (Sorensen, 2007; Eckhardt, Shane, & 
Delmar, 2006).  
Second, financial capital is typically considered to be a commodity good (Janney & 
Folta, 2006; Janney & Folta, 2003) as opposed to a unique resource. Traditional finance 
models, such as the static trade-off theory and pecking order theory, portray financial 
intermediaries as passive actors (Myers, 1984). This explains the current focus in the literature 
on the type of financing firms attract, while the decision from which source to attract 
financing has received considerably less attention (Cassar, 2004; Kochhar & Hitt, 1998). 
However, intermediaries specialized in financing growth-oriented entrepreneurial firms, such 
as venture capital investors and business angels, are highly selective in the firms they are 
willing to invest in, play an active role as monitors and add value after they have invested in 
the company (Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996)3. This makes private equity a source of 
finance that is scarce, distinctive and imperfectly mobile across companies and it indicates 
that financial capital is not necessarily a commodity good, but might create sustainable 
differences in development between firms. 
Third, it is assumed that financing decisions are based solely on economic 
optimization at the time with no influence from prior financing decisions and outcomes (see, 
for example, Fama & French, 2005; Frank & Goyal, 2005). Nevertheless, previous 
experiences with particular types of financing and prior contacts with particular investors may 
influence financing decisions. Helwege and Liang, for example, show that once firms obtain 
external financing they are more likely to obtain it in the future. However, whether this is due 
to external financing needs that are correlated across time, learning by entrepreneurs or other 
processes, remains unclear. Overall, dynamics in the financing process remain poorly 
understood (Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar, 2006).  
The resulting image is one of entrepreneurs that make optimal financing decision at 
one point in time under a number of constraints, such as the willingness to remain 
independent and information processing limits. Where financial capital gives access to other 
critical resources, such as human capital and physical capital, but is in itself not a unique 
resource.  
                                               
 
3
 Also more traditional financial intermediaries, such as banks, have been proposed to monitor loans by firms who borrow 
from them (Diamond, 1984).  
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This is in contrast with recent organizational studies indicating that the financing 
process may be a key external prompt initiating sustainable differences in development 
between high and low performing firms. This tension motives us to study the financing 
process from a different theoretical lens, namely an evolutionary model of development. An 
evolutionary theory posits that differences will exist between firms in the same industry and 
that those differences are likely to persist across time (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The following 
three interrelated research questions are addressed: (a) how does the financing process differ 
between high and low performing firms, (b) how do those differences originate and (c) why 
do those differences persist?  
 
METHODS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design is a longitudinal, multiple case study involving nine young 
biotechnology firms. Case studies allow us to broaden existing findings by pointing to gaps 
and beginning to fill those gaps by generating new insights in a underexplored research area 
(Siggelkow, 2007). We employ longitudinal case studies, as these are particularly suitable to 
study process issues. Multiple cases enable a replication logic in which cases are treated as a 
series of experiments, each serving to confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from the others 
(Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989b). The results of multiple-case research are typically better 
grounded than those of single-case studies. The research also uses an embedded design (i.e. 
multiple levels of analysis) that includes both the entrepreneur and investor. Although an 
embedded design is complex, it permits richer and more reliable models (Yin, 1984). 
We chose young biotechnology firms as our research setting for two reasons. First, it 
allows us to focus the study on one type of financing, namely private equity, such as venture 
capital and business angel financing. The characteristics of the biotechnology setting limit the 
use and availability of other financing alternatives. Traditional sources of financing, such as 
internal financing or debt financing are typically unavailable or even unsuitable (Pisano, 
2006). In order to get at a stage where it is possible to raise other types of outside equity 
financing, such as public equity and private equity from large pharmaceutical companies (if 
that is part of the strategy of the firm), it is typically necessary to first raise private equity 
from other external sources, such as venture capitalists and business angels (Nilsson, 2001). 
Second, given the difficulty to attract financial capital, financing decisions are decisions of 
heightened importance in young biotechnology firms (Greene, 1999).  
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Therefore, biotechnology entrepreneurs are expected to pay considerable effort and 
time in raising financing. 
We selected cases opportunistically based on a theoretical sampling procedure 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). In order to generate insight on how differences in the financing process 
relate to firm performance, we selected matched pairs of biotechnology firms that operated 
under similar conditions but differed considerably with respect to their performance (Table 1). 
Young biotechnology firms were labeled as high or low performing based on widely applied 
proxies, such as employment growth, total asset growth and patenting rate (Maurer & Ebers, 
2006). These dimensions gauge biotechnology startups’ growth across a diverse range of 
dimensions critical to early success: success in recruiting human capital, investments in 
tangible and more importantly intangible assets, and development of intellectual property 
(Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000). 
All cases are pure biotechnology firms active in research and development (R&D). 
Pure biotechnology firms are founded with the main purpose of exploiting opportunities 
provided by modern biotechnology. We do not consider firms from traditional sectors whose 
activities only partially involve biotechnology. Biotechnology firms had to undertake R&D to 
(partially) develop new innovative products and services to be introduced on the market. 
Requiring all firms to be active in R&D ensures that we are studying a more homogenous 
group of growth-oriented firms with high financing needs (Nilsson, 2001)4.  
Insert Table 1 About Here 
We control for the following contextual factors in our sampling that might have an 
effect on the financing process: location, characteristics of the founders, firm origin and 
market sentiment at the first financing round. In order to control for location and 
corresponding differences in the legal context and development of financial markets, we 
restrict our cases to Flemish biotechnology firms. The Flemish biotechnology cluster is 
vibrant, but developing. The number of biotechnology firms per inhabitant and the number of 
employees per biotechnology firm lies above the European average (Flanders 
Interuniversitary Institute for Biotechnology, 2002).  
                                               
 
4
 We ensure that the sampled biotechnology firms are active in R&D by (a) asking a filter question through preliminary 
telephone interviews (b) checking if the respective cases appeared in a listing of firms that applied for R&D subsidies from 
the most important R&D subsidy granting agency in Flanders. 
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The biotechnology industry, however, is relatively young. Most of the medical 
biotechnology firms have been founded in 1995 or later. This implies that Flemish 
biotechnology firms are typically founded by pure scientists. There is still no well-developed 
market of ‘second-generation’ biotechnology managers (Flanders Interuniversitary Institute for 
Biotechnology, 2002). This stands in contrast to the UK and US biotechnology industry, where 
scientific entrepreneurs accumulated founding and management experience through earlier foundings 
(Maurer & Ebers, 2006). Hence, limiting our cases to Flemish biotechnology firms has the additional 
advantage that founding teams are rather similar and are all characterized by limited prior business 
experience and limited formal education in business administration. 
We include firms from different origins, such as academic spin-offs, corporate spin-
offs and spin-offs from specialized research institutes (Table 1) as the origin of the firm may 
influence the financing process (Lindelof & Lofsten, 2005)5. Furthermore, it is well 
established in the literature that private equity investments show a cyclical pattern (Gompers 
& Lerner, 1998). We controlled for the availability of private equity financing by sampling 
matched pairs raising their first private equity financing during hot markets and cold markets 
(Table 1). Pharmaleads and Theraptosis raised start-up financing during 2000. This was a 
record year; both in terms of amount of financing raised by private equity investors and in 
terms of amount invested in their portfolio companies (EVCA Yearbooks). Entomed, Myosic, 
AC Pharma, Irogen, Genom, I-Zyme and Aptanomics raised private equity financing for the 
first time after 2000, a period during which investments by venture capitalists decreased 
dramatically, especially in high technology sectors (EVCA Yearbooks)6. 
The characteristics of the cases are summarized in table 2. Firms are founded between 
1999 and 2003. The cases are all pure biotechnology firms active in areas, as diagnostics, 
therapeutics, technology platforms and environment. At start-up, the average firm employs 4.8 
people and has an average asset base of €2,031,000. Based on figures from the most recent 
fiscal year (2006) the cases currently employ on average 25.6 people and have an average 
asset base of €18,069,000. All firms start with an (exclusive) license on a patent or patent 
portfolio from the university or parent company, but have no patents (granted) on their own 
name yet.  
                                               
 
5
 A popular image in the entrepreneurship literature is that of an entrepreneur starting an independent business from his 
garage (Bhide, 1992). This image is unlikely in our setting. Given the research and development intensive nature, 
biotechnology firms typically originate from academia or the business community. 
 
6
 Most of our matched cases raised financing during cold markets. This is because our research interest was in studying 
dynamics in the financing process of young biotechnology ventures that were maximum five years old at the start of data 
collection.  
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The average number of patents granted to the firm up until 2006 equals 7.8.  The 
median number of equity financing rounds equals two, with a minimum of one and maximum 
of four. In none of the cases had the investor exited when the firm was selected for the 
purpose of this study. However, in some cases a (partial) exit was realized while we followed 
the cases in real time and this under different forms such as an IPO, trade sale or failure. 
Therefore, our results do not suffer from a success or survivorship bias. This is an important 
advantage compared to prior studies that only focus on quoted (Gompers, 1995) or surviving 
firms (Beckman & Burton, 2008) due to data constraints.  
Insert Table 2 About Here 
There is a large difference in growth and development between the cases that were 
selected as high versus low performing biotechnology firms. High performing firms employ 
between 10 and 67 people, while low performing firms employ between three and four 
people. The amount of assets lies between €2,248,000 and €119,559,000 for high performing 
firms, while the maximum amount of assets in the low performing cases equals only 
€894,000. The high performing firms were granted a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 22 
new patents up to 2006. Low performing firms have not been granted patents since founding, 
except Entomed with two patents granted since founding. 
 
DATA SOURCES 
We used several data sources (Table 3): (1) quantitative and qualitative data from 
semi-structured interviews with key financial decision makers from both biotechnology firms 
and biotechnology investors, (2) e-mails and phone calls to follow-up interviews and track the 
financing process in real time, (3) financial statement data7 and statutory required publications 
on capital increases and shareholder structure and (4) archival data, including Web sites, 
business publications and materials provided by informants. The use of multiple data sources 
increases the validity and reliability of the evidence (Yin, 1984).  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
                                               
 
7
 All Belgian firms, irrespective of their size, are required to file detailed yearly financial statements. 
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We conducted more than 40 interviews. All interviews were conducted by at least two 
researchers, where one researcher exclusively dealt with making field notes. Additionally all 
interviews were taped and then transcribed in the hours following the interview. The first 
phase included pilot interviews with biotechnology entrepreneurs, biotechnology investors, 
policy makers within the biotechnology domain and members of the biotechnology 
association. During the pilot interviews, we fine-tuned the interview guides targeting 
entrepreneurs and investors. The pilot interviews indicated that financing decisions within 
biotechnology firms are typically made by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) eventually 
helped by a Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Other individuals within the biotechnology firms, 
such as senior scientists, typically have limited detailed knowledge about the financing events 
taking place. 
In the primary data collection, we conducted 15 semi-structured interviews with key 
informants within the biotechnology firms. The interviewees who were our informants were 
the founding entrepreneurs and senior management. The interviews were 90-120 minutes and 
followed an interview guide that had variations for the different biotechnology cases. The 
interviews began with background information, such as management team composition and 
prior experiences, core technology, products in the pipeline, market characteristics and 
alliances. We then asked informants to chronologically discuss the history of the firm with 
respect to its financing process. Based on yearly financial statements and statutory required 
publications on capital increases, interviewers prepared a financing timeline in advance of the 
interview. This financing timeline captured the history of the financing obtained and was used 
during the interview to crosscheck information provided by our informants. During the 
interviews, we additionally discussed the financing unsuccessfully applied for and financing 
which entrepreneurs were not willing to consider. 
We also conducted nine semi-structured interviews with selected biotechnology 
investors that offered financing to the cases studied. Given the sensitive nature of the 
financing process, we did not require investors to discuss individual portfolio companies. We 
focused on the general investment process and discussed the different phases in the 
investment process from deal origination through exit. This strategy allowed us to link 
detailed investor characteristics to the cases. Furthermore, despite the sensitive nature of the 
topic studied, some investors while discussing the general investment process, offered 
examples involving the cases studied. Other investors even provided confidential reports on 
their portfolio companies at the end of the interview.  
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We interviewed independent and private, independent and quoted, university-related, 
bank-related and corporate venture capital funds that invested as little as €500,000 to as much 
as €194,000,000 in biotech. 
The transcriptions alone totaled 700 double spaced pages. We asked follow-up 
questions via phone or interview when clarification was needed. Part of this study is 
historical, in the sense that we rely on interviews and archival data to obtain a retrospective 
account of the financing process. Following Van de Ven (2007), however, we initiated a 
historical study before the ultimate outcomes of the financing process became apparent. The 
IPOs, trade sale and failure of the cases all occurred in the years following the interviews. As 
important changes took place in the financing process after our interviews, we tracked change 
in the financing process in real time. We collected additional financial statements, statutory 
required publications and new press releases. Additionally, we attended management road 
shows and asked short additional questions through e-mail or telephone. 
Throughout our data collection, we took steps to minimize informant biases. Given 
that we study young biotechnology firms -that are maximum 5 years old at the time of the first 
interview- and that capital acquisition decisions are major decisions, we limit recall bias 
(Neisser, 1982). If informants had difficulties in accurately remembering financing events, we 
would expect differences in the information they provided with data from other sources. This 
was not the case, however. We also focused on facts during the interview process. An 
emphasis on facts is likely to be less subjective to both cognitive biases and impression 
management (Miller et al., 1997). The information given was quite objective (e.g. whether a 
company applied for different sources of funding, whether investors had prior ties to the 
investors from which they raised financing and how investors helped the firm with raising 
follow-on financing). To further motivate interviewees to give accurate data we promised 
confidentiality. 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
We analyzed the data by first building individual case studies synthesizing the 
interview transcripts and archival data (Eisenhardt, 1989b). A central aspect of case writing 
was “triangulation” between interview and archival sources to create a richer, more reliable 
account. Case histories were used for two analyses: within-case and cross-case. The within-
case analysis focused on the financing timeline, which summarized all financing events, 
unsuccessful financing events and important facts and conclusions for the individual cases. 
Within-case analysis allowed us to describe the financing process in detail as experienced by a 
single firm. Through this process, we noted patterns within each case. Next, the conclusions 
from each individual case were considered to be information needing replication by other 
individual cases (Yin, 1984).  
Cross-case analysis began after all cases were finished (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Using 
cross-case analysis techniques, we looked for similar constructs and relationships across 
cases. We heavily relied on cross-case synthesis by using (word) tables and graphs that 
display the data according to a uniform framework. The tables were used to study whether 
different groups of cases were more similar and whether particular subgroups or categories of 
general cases could be identified (Yin, 1984).  
 
MAIN FINDINGS 
How does the Financing Process Differ between High and Low Performing Firms? 
Prior studies typically portray the financing process as a teleological model where firm 
history and previous financing decisions have limited, if no, influence on subsequent 
financing decisions (see, for example, Frank & Goyal, 2005 and Fama & French, 2005). Our 
data suggest that the source from which firms attract financing during the startup phase, the 
financial resources they can subsequently access during the development phase and firm 
performance are interrelated. Historical financing decisions have a substantial impact on the 
subsequent financing process and firm performance as a whole.  
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Table 4 shows the type of investors and the financing round in which they participated. 
We differentiate between the high and low performing cases. Specialized venture capital 
funds (VCFs) are funds that (a) actively invest in biotechnology firms and (b) have a team 
dedicated to biotechnology proposals. The non-specialized VCFs comprise university funds, 
private equity subsidiaries of banks and other non-specialized VCFs (funds investing 
infrequently in the biotech sector without a team dedicated to this sector). Besides formal 
venture capital, our cases received financing from business angels (BAs) defined as wealthy 
individuals investing their personal funds in privately held firms. Finally, the parent company 
in case of corporate spin-offs generally offered start-up financing.  
It is remarkable that all cases receiving specialized venture capital during the startup 
phase are also those firms classified (prior to collecting the data and knowing the final 
outcome of the cases) as high performing. The high performing firms also raise the largest 
amount of pre-exit financing. Aptanomics, Genom, Theraptosis and AC Pharma have all 
raised over €6,000,000. Aptanomics, Genom and Theraptosis have even raised a cumulative 
amount of private equity exceeding €25,000,000. Firms backed by specialized investors 
during the start-up phase are also more likely to conduct an Initial Public Offering (IPO). 
Aptanomics, Genom and Theraptosis, all financed by specialized VCFs, have conducted an 
Initial Public Offering (IPO). Going public is a momentous event for biotechnology firms: it 
gives the firm access to well-needed capital, increases legitimacy and is an important exit 
mechanism (Deeds, Decarolis, & Coombs, 1997). This is in sharp contrast to the firms starting 
with non-specialized financing. These firms raise significantly smaller amounts of follow-on 
financing, if any. Furthermore, not one firm conducted an IPO. We observed only one exit, 
which was a failure (case Myosic).  
Insert Table 4 About Here 
Aptanomics is a good illustration of a firm significantly benefiting from its early 
affiliation with a specialized investor. Mid 2001, Aptanomics received seed financing (only 
62,000 euro) from a specialized Belgian venture capital fund. This fund previously invested in 
other spin-offs from the research institute from which Aptonomics spun-off. The specialized 
fund helped in searching for an experienced manager
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The venture capital fund found a Belgian manager in the US, who previously held key 
management positions in four European and US biotechnology firms and had nearly 25 years 
of experience in the biotechnology sector. According to this manager, who joined 
Aptanomics, the fund was also instrumental in helping to attract specialized financing from 
international funds later on. By August 2002, the company raised some 5 million euro in start-
up financing.  
Entomed, in contrast, is a good illustration of a firm constrained by its initial non-
specialized investor.  The firm started in 2002 by two science professors as a university spin-
off. One of the founders contacted a business professor in his network to help in the search for 
start-up financing. This professor personally knew a local VCF manager, who subsequently 
decided to offer financing. Expectations at start-up were high: the firm would develop into a 
professional biotechnology firm in two to three years, employing 25 to 30 people (Source: 
university report). The initial investor, however, was not specialized. Although the investor 
previously invested a couple of times in biotechnology firms, the CEO mentioned that the 
investor “is not very selective” and that “specialized investors would be better for the 
expertise and management support”. The investor also made it clear that the fund was 
unlikely to offer follow-on financing. However, Entomed would need at least an additional 1 
million euro within the next three years. Today, more than four years after founding, the firm 
employs four people (FTE), which is far below expectations. The CEO did not receive much 
support from the founding investor and was unable to attract specialized venture capital. 
Instead, the CEO once more resorted to pre-existing ties and received financing from the 
university seed fund.  
We claim that specialized investors help their portfolio firms in raising large amounts 
of specialized follow-on financing. Furthermore, specialized investors contribute indirectly to 
the ease with which their portfolio firms can attract specialized follow-on financing. 
Consistent with Hellmann and Puri (2002), we illustrated how they play a key role in 
professionalizing the firm by shaping the management team. Access to large amounts of 
follow-on financing and firm professionalization subsequently benefit firm performance. We 
observe different processes in the firms starting with non-specialized investors. Although 
some non-specialized investors helped their portfolio firms with raising follow-on financing, 
this follow-on financing typically comes from other non-specialized investors. The portfolio 
firms of non-specialized investors are at a competitive disadvantage when targeting 
specialized investors, because of the limited network and lack of reputation in the biotech 
investment community of the early investor.  
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Furthermore, also non-specialized investors initiate changes in the management team, 
although less prevalent. However, it typically involves part-time managers or managers where 
the track record of building young biotechnology firms is less obvious, which is different from 
the additions made by specialized investors. 
We considered several alternative explanations. One is that the cases differed in 
quality and growth potential at start-up. Firms with higher potential might search financing 
from specialized investors (Sorensen, 2007) or specialized investors might be better at 
selecting firms with the highest potential (Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). However, this 
explanation seems unlikely in our setting. Predicting firm success in high technology 
industries is very difficult (Lerner, 1999). When analyzing the growth of startups, Audretsch 
(1995) shows how no firm nor industry characteristics are able to predict growth in high-
technology industries. Our cases support this view as early signals of firm potential do not 
differ systematically between firms backed by specialized versus non-specialized investors. 
First, nearly all firms are founded by pure scientists with limited or no business experience. 
Hence, there is little variance in initial human capital. If experienced managers are recruited 
after start-up, this is typically under the impetus of the initial investor. In the case of 
Aptanomics, for example, a highly experienced manager was attracted, who was known by 
the founding venture capital fund from prior investments. Second, no consistent differences 
are observed in terms of alliance capital, amount of pre-founding R&D, maturity of the 
technology and market orientation (Table 5). Important differences between the two groups of 
firms only become apparent in the development stage, approximately three years after 
founding, when follow-on financing is raised. Hence, we found no indications that the cases 
differ in quality at start-up. 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
A second explanation is that differences in motivation between entrepreneurs and 
more in particular differences in growth ambition drive our findings. Not all entrepreneurs are 
growth-oriented and the majority of entrepreneurs set up new businesses to provide an income 
or support a desired lifestyle (Berger & Udell, 1998). In many cases, these entrepreneurs will 
even sacrifice growth for lifestyle choices (Manigart & Struyf, 1997). Prior research confirms 
that growth motivation has a positive impact on realized growth (Delmar & Wiklund, 2008; 
Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003).  
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Nevertheless, even the entrepreneurs in the low performing cases were initially high 
growth oriented. Entomed, for example, planned to develop into a professional biotechnology 
firm in two to three years after founding, employing 25 to 30 people (Source: university 
report). The CEO of Myosic envisioned to raise some 10 million euro in follow-on financing 
and subsequently conduct an IPO (Source: initial business plan). The CEO of Pharmaleads 
compared its firm with another academic spin-off from the same university, which 
experienced dramatic growth and conducted an IPO (Source: university report). Despite their 
high growth ambitions at start-up, all of these firms seem unable to realize high growth. 
 
How do Initial Differences in the Financing Process Originate? 
In the previous section, we demonstrated how the initial financing source plays a 
critical role. Firms starting early with specialized investors attract large amounts of follow-on 
financing and exhibit high subsequent performance, while firms starting with non-specialized 
investors attract limited amounts of follow-on financing and exhibit poor performance. A key 
question that emerges is why some firms start with specialized financing while others start 
with non-specialized financing?  
Most prior research assumes that once entrepreneurs are willing to attract outside financing 
they will consider the entire range of investors and investors will consider investing in the entire pool 
of firms trying to raise outside financing (Sorensen, 2007; Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar, 2006). In a 
heterogeneous market with more experienced investors, experienced investors are able to select from 
the entire pool of good and worse quality proposals. When entrepreneurs are confronted with multiple 
offers, they will engage in an optimization exercise, where they will rank investors by experience and 
eventually accept the offer of the most experienced investor (Hsu, 2004). A given investor with less 
experience will be pushed down in the relative ranking and will be left with firms of worse quality 
(Sorensen, 2007).  
Our cases indicate a different behavior. Entrepreneurs typically limit their search for 
financing to only one or a few alternatives, especially at founding. The social context within 
which resource decisions are embedded and more specifically pre-existing ties between 
entrepreneurs and investors influence the entrepreneur’s search for financing. The pre-
founding situation has an important impact on resource acquisition at start-up. Firm origin and 
existing contacts of the entrepreneur through previous employment, for example, determine to 
a large extent which investor is targeted. Table 6 presents objective information and facts, 
which are supplemented with illustrative quotes from our cases, on the relationship between 
the social context and financing decisions.  
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Table 6 indicates that the search for financing is local. The notion of local search is a 
relative term and presumes a broader context (Stuart & Podolny, 1996). We define local 
search in the financing process as the search for financing from investors with whom the 
entrepreneur or firm has pre-existing ties as opposed to unrelated investors. Why do 
entrepreneurs limit their search for financing to one or a few investors with whom they have 
pre-existing ties despite the strategic nature of their decisions? The cases suggest that the 
social context is important as (a) it helps in locating potential investors, (b) it shapes norms, 
values and taken-for-granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate economic 
behavior and (c) helps in assessing the quality and intentions of investors.  
Insert Table 6 About Here 
Locating investors. Prior research typically assumes that entrepreneurs are aware of 
the full spectrum of financing alternatives (Sorensen, 2007), as there is free and directly 
available information in perfect markets (Brealey & Myers, 2000). However, the acquisition 
of financial capital is a function of the amount of information that is available to the 
entrepreneur. Information deficiencies limit entrepreneurs’ set of choices and inexperienced 
entrepreneurs are therefore expected to have a more limited set of financing choices (Van 
Auken, 2001). Biotechnology firms are a typical example of firms that are founded by 
entrepreneurs with limited business and financing experience. However, social capital benefits 
firms in identifying where the needed resources are available (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Rangan, 
2000). As a result, entrepreneurs are more likely to search for financing from investors with 
whom the have pre-existing ties, as these ties increase the likelihood that the entrepreneur will 
identify these investors as potential exchange partners.  
Taken-for-granted assumptions. An institutional view indicates that the motives of 
human behavior extend beyond economic optimization to social justification and social 
obligation (Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990). When managers justify actions with the claim that 
“we’ve always done it this way”, “everybody does it this way” they are referring to 
institutionalized activities (Oliver, 1997). Once entrepreneurs have located investors through a 
network search, they typically do not engage in a broader search outside their network and 
consider network search as appropriate economic behavior.  
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In Pharmaleads and Theraptosis, two university spin-offs, for example, the CEOs 
justified why they only searched for financing from the university seed funds at startup by 
indicating that it is the norm for spin-offs. In Genom, a corporate spin-off, the CEO indicated 
that he did not need to look further for financing, because the parent companies were willing 
to offer finance (Table 6). However, later the CEO recognized that the firm was too dependent 
on its parent companies and therefore he targeted independent venture capital investors in a 
second round of financing. 
Evaluation of investors. Informational asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors 
may lead to a failure in the financial market (Shane & Cable, 2002). Adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems, which relate to the existence of informational asymmetry, are often 
viewed as a problem of the investor (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Entrepreneurs are typically portrayed 
as possessing private information, which they may use to mislead investors (Eisenhardt, 
1989a). However, entrepreneurs also need to evaluate investors and informational asymmetry 
is also a problem for them (Sahlman, 1990). For instance, as the entrepreneur and venture 
capitalist interact, the venture capitalist will become more informed and may continue the 
project without the entrepreneur (Ueda, 2004). The risk of expropriation may make 
entrepreneurs reluctant to disclose information (Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994) and will 
restrict the search for financing. The following quotes illustrate: 
 
“Particularly pre-investment, entrepreneurs are wary to disclose all information to us. Information 
transfer is always very delicate. We live in an extremely competitive world and we have a large number 
of portfolio companies. It happens that a business that looks for financing is a competitor of one of our 
portfolio companies or that there is at least a partial overlap. Even when two companies start very 
different, they may gradually become more similar over a 4-5 year timeframe. Therefore, information 
transfer is often a problem... However, when we do not receive all the information, we will not make the 
investment.” (Senior biotechnology investment manager, Investor F, Specialized VCF) 
 
“Unwillingness to provide information is something which happens more often with external 
entrepreneurs. It is less of a problem if we work with scientist from our own university.” (Managing 
Partner, Investor A, Academic VCF) 
 
Our results offer additional evidence on the importance of the social context in the 
financing process. Prior studies indicate that investors are more likely to offer financing to 
entrepreneurs with whom they have pre-existing ties (Shane & Cable, 2002; Uzzi, 1999). We 
claim that the demand side of the market might also explain these findings.  
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More in particular, entrepreneurs are also more likely to target investors that are 
known to the entrepreneur from prior direct or indirect contacts.  
Hence, the social context within which financial decisions are embedded determines 
from whom entrepreneurs will search for financing and explains initial differences in the 
financing process. 
 
Why do Initial Differences in the Financing Process Persist? 
Although prior research described financial capital as a commodity product (Janney & 
Folta, 2006; Janney & Folta, 2003), as opposed to a unique resource, our cases indicate that 
the source of initial financing influences the subsequent financing process and firm 
performance as a whole. Why is it that the initial financing source plays such as critical role? 
We identify a number of isolating mechanisms, which limit the ability of firms to imitate 
others or duplicate the success of others (Rumelt, 1984). The first mechanism relates to 
learning by entrepreneurs. As entrepreneurs interact with investors, they accumulate specific 
knowledge with respect to the financing process. The second and third mechanism refers to 
syndication preferences by investors. It is common for firms to receive funding from multiple 
investors (a syndicate) over several investment rounds. Homophily and network 
considerations play an important role in investors’ decisions with whom they want to 
syndicate. 
Entrepreneur: Local Learning. Many of the cognitive limits that constrain rationality 
in search behavior will also affect learning (Levinthal & March, 1993). A first characteristic 
of learning is that it tends to happen locally (Levitt & March, 1988), i.e. entrepreneurs are 
more likely to learn from their own past experiences rather than from experiences from others 
such as competitors. When searching for financing entrepreneurs are likely to learn many 
facets of dealing with investors, such as how to present a project to investors and negotiate 
with investors. Furthermore, once the financing is received entrepreneurs are likely to learn 
more about the characteristics of the financing and of investors as interactions occur between 
investors and entrepreneurs.  
Second, learning is cumulative in nature (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This means that 
entrepreneurs will develop knowledge based on past experiences that will benefit them in their 
search for future financing. Repetition of the same task benefits entrepreneurs in performing 
those tasks and knowledge gained from interacting with investors is expected to accumulate.  
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The following quote illustrates:  
 
“During the seed stage, half of the entrepreneurs are unaware of our expectations and requirements. I 
clearly notice progress in the quality of the business plans between the first and second financing round. 
Later on entrepreneurs are better prepared, have informed themselves adequately and have thought 
about alternative financing sources…”. (Senior investment manager, Investor D, Academic VCF) 
 
“The first financing round helped me to improve the way I present and negotiate with investors. I now 
feel it will be easier to locate new financing sources for the second financing round.” (CEO Myosic) 
 
The pre-investment process of VCFs is a lengthy process containing several hurdles, 
such as initial screening, due diligence, valuation and contracting (Fried & Hisrich, 1994). 
Prior research has shown that VCFs exhibit significant heterogeneity in their selection 
behavior (Muzyka, Birley, & Leleux, 1996), level of experience (Hsu, 2004) and goals for 
investing in firms (Hellmann et al, 2008). Because of this heterogeneity, the investment 
process will be different between VCFs and approaching different investors requires different 
strategies, knowledge and skills.  
Learning performance is greatest when the object of learning is related to what is 
already known. As a result, learning will be more difficult in novel domains (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). Hence, entrepreneurs are more likely to use those financing strategies that 
were successful in the past and are expected to target similar investors to those that offered 
financing in the past. Similar investors are defined as investors that are similar to prior 
investors in terms of degree of specialization and ownership amongst other dimensions. 
Furthermore, as the frequency of using a strategy increases, the efficiency and likelihood of 
success of that strategy will increase (Levitt & March, 1988). Entrepreneurs will become more 
capable at attracting financing from similar types of investors. This will further enforce the 
application of prior strategies in the search for new financial resources and as a result, 
entrepreneurs will be more likely to search financing from similar investors for future needs.  
We argue that entrepreneurs that move through the investment process of specialized 
investors, for example, will learn and absorb different knowledge compared to entrepreneurs 
starting with non-specialized investors. The entrepreneur interacting with specialized 
investors is more likely to learn how to approach other specialized investors compared to an 
entrepreneur that previously received non-specialized financing.  
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This because the entrepreneur initially backed by specialized investors can use its 
repertoire of routines that proved to be successful during past searches for financing from 
specialized investors. Entrepreneurs getting non-specialized financing early on will have 
developed a repertoire of routines that is significantly different and not necessarily apt to 
approach specialized investors.  
 
Investor Syndication Preferences: Homophily. Homophily implies that investors prefer 
to form an investment syndicate with similar others. Prior research shows that high status 
financial intermediaries are more likely to cooperate with other high status financial 
intermediaries, but avoid forming a syndicate with low status intermediaries (Podolny, 1993). 
Our cases illustrate, for example, how experienced investors attract other experienced 
investors. The following quotes illustrate:  
 
“Assume we receive two similar proposals: one from company X and one from company Y. However, 
in company X we have an experienced investor and in company Y we have a fund that invested for the 
first time in biotechnology. We will definitely select company X and I believe we will be very hesitant 
to invest in company Y.” (Senior biotechnology investment manager, Investor F, Specialized VCF)   
 
 “If you start with experienced and well networked investors it is easy to attract similar investors in the 
future. If you start with inexperienced and poorly networked investors, nobody wants to join the 
syndicate later-on.” (CEO Aptanomics) 
 
The above argument further enforces the implications of the learning argument on the 
demand side of the market. While entrepreneurs become more capable at raising financing 
from investors similar to their early investors, investors themselves are more willing to 
collaborate with investors that are similar to them. Hence, these isolating mechanisms work in 
tandem and reinforce each other.  
 
Investor Syndication Preferences: Network Considerations. Prior research on the 
selection of alliance partners indicates that the social context is one of the key factors shaping 
partner selection (Gulati, 1995). Similarly, research studying founding teams indicates the 
social context plays a key role in the composition of these groups (Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 
2003). We find a similar mechanism to operate in the composition of investment syndicates.  
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Investors are more likely to collaborate with investors they know from previous 
investments. Our cases consistently illustrate how investors form a syndicate with the same 
group of local and foreign investors.   
 
The following quote illustrates:  
 
“You always see particular funds investing together…You almost always see investor F investing first 
[a Belgian fund] and investors X and Z [non-Belgian, Continental European funds] offering follow-on 
financing.” (Investment manager, Investor H, Specialized VCF) 
 
Why do investors prefer to form a syndicate with other investors they know from 
previous investments? Embedded relationships are preferred as they enhance information 
transfer through the development of relationship specific heuristics and reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding other investors’ behavior (Gulati, 1995). One important risk perceived by 
biotechnology investors is that other investors do not allocate sufficient funds for follow-on 
financing. By deciding to co-invest with investors known through previous mutual 
investments in the biotechnology sector, investors limit this risk. This is especially important 
in our setting, as the uncertainty surrounding an investment is high. The risk of inappropriate 
financing or an unsuccessful financing round is high given the requirement of a series of 
crucial capital injections over a long period of time (Pisano, 2006). An unsuccessful financing 
round may cause distress and even failure and consequently increases the risk to any single 
finance provider (Oakey, 1995). The following quote illustrates:  
 
“It is important to know who your co-investors are…You want to know before you enter a venture how 
your co-investors will react when problems emerge, follow-on financing is needed at a later stage… If 
you look at our investment portfolio you will see a number of co-investors emerging frequently…” 
(Senior biotechnology investment manager, Investor F, Specialized VCF) 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We began by noting that recent research advanced the financing process as a key 
external prompt initiating differences in development between high and low performing firms 
(Maurer & Ebers, 2006). Despite extensive research, the literature on the financing process 
rests on a few common assumptions. First, financing decisions are guided by economic 
rationality. Entrepreneurs make value-maximizing financing decisions (Myers, 1984) within 
some constraints, such as the willingness to remain independent and keep control over the 
firm (Sapienza, Korsgaard, & Forbes, 2003) and knowledge about financing alternatives (Van 
Auken, 2001). Furthermore, it is assumed that external investors have access to the entire pool 
of firms willing to attract external financing (Sorensen, 2007; Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar, 
2006). Second, financial intermediaries are typically portrayed as passive actors. Hence, 
financial capital is a commodity product (Janney & Folta, 2006; Janney & Folta, 2003), 
allowing the firm to buy other key resources, such as additional human resources and physical 
resources. Finally, financing decisions involve an optimization at one point in time, where 
prior financing decisions play a limited or no role (Fama & French, 2005; Frank & Goyal, 
2005). These assumptions make it difficult to understand why organizational studies indicate 
that the financing process is a key external prompt initiating sustainable differences in 
development between firms. 
In contrast to the most influential theoretical frameworks in the finance literature, 
which can be classified as teleological models, our findings form an emergent framework of 
the financing process as an evolutionary process. First, differences in the initial source of 
financing matter. The initial source from which firms attract financing influences the 
subsequent financing process and firm performance as a whole. All our high performing cases 
start with specialized investors, while all low performing cases start with non-specialized 
investors. We demonstrate that differences in performance are unlikely to be explained by 
differences in firm quality or growth potential nor by differences in growth ambitions at 
startup.  
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Second, despite the difficulty to attract financial resources and the importance of 
financing decisions in the biotechnology setting (Greene, 1999), entrepreneurs do not perform 
an elaborate search for financial resources at startup. They typically limit their search to one 
or a few investors, with whom they have pre-existing ties. Ties help in locating investors, 
create taken-for-granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate search behavior and 
help in evaluating investors. Hence, prior studies researching financing decisions in isolation, 
irrespective of firm history and previous decisions, miss a lot of the contextual background to 
fully understand these decisions. 
Third, we identify isolating mechanisms that make it difficult for firms to replicate 
successful financing strategies from their peers. As entrepreneurs interact with investors, they 
learn about the characteristics of financing and investors. We claim that entrepreneurs 
interacting with specialized investors early on absorb different knowledge and develop 
different heuristics for searching follow-on financing compared to entrepreneurs starting with 
non-specialized investors. It makes entrepreneurs backed by specialized investors more likely 
and better able to attract financing from other specialized investors in subsequent financing 
rounds. Syndication preferences by investors strengthen differences between firms starting 
with specialized versus non-specialized investors. Investors prefer to syndicate with similar 
investors in future financing rounds and are more likely to form a syndicate with investors 
known through prior investments.  
This research contributes to work on path dependence by extending it to the financing 
process. We demonstrate how initial financing decisions are influenced by the origin of the 
firm and pre-existing ties between the founding team and investors. Furthermore, we show 
how early financing decisions influence the subsequent financing process and firm 
performance. While prior studies illustrate path dependence in organizational strategies 
(Boeker, 1989), R&D activities (Helfat, 1994), cooperation in strategic alliances (Doz, 1996), 
employment systems (Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 2001) and the structure and experience of 
top management teams (Beckman & Burton, 2008), we are not aware of prior research 
illustrating path dependence in the financing process. Furthermore, we theorize on how 
entrepreneurs and investors enforce path dependence in the financing process.  
Additionally, our study demonstrates how network closure theory (Coleman, 1990) 
and structural hole theory (Burt, 1992) play a complementary role in explaining the impact of 
cohesive ties on firm development. Network closure theory proposes that cohesive ties are 
valuable to firm development, while structural hole theory proposes that cohesive ties act as a 
source of inertia and weak ties are more important to firm development (Gargiulo & Benassi, 
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2000). We have illustrated the importance of cohesive ties and more specifically the 
institutional origin and pre-founding networks in the search for start-up financing. Some firms 
got trapped in their own network of cohesive ties which is consistent with structural hole 
theory. However, in other cases firms resorted to network leverage and cohesive ties to initial 
investors allowed firms to gain access to resources, such as large amounts of international 
venture capital, that are generally thought to be unavailable. Whether cohesive ties hinder or 
foster firms in their development and ability to raise future financing is contingent on the 
compositional quality of these ties. Compositional quality refers to the extent to which a 
particular tie can provide the needed resources such as financing, but also expertise and 
legitimacy (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Specialized investors have more experience in the 
biotechnology sector and are therefore better linked in the biotechnology (investment) 
community compared to non-specialized investors. Hence, the compositional quality of a tie 
to specialized investors is higher. Our cases illustrate how initial ties to specialized investors 
typically stimulate firm growth, while ties to non-specialized investors typically constrain 
firm development. 
Our study also adds to recent studies acknowledging heterogeneity between venture 
capital investors. Prior research shows that industry-specific experience by venture capital 
firms benefits their portfolio companies (Sorensen, 2007; Dimov & Shepherd, 2005). 
However, the mechanisms behind the superior performance of firms backed by specialized 
investors compared to those backed by non-specialized investors remain unclear (Gompers et 
al. 2008). Our research answers the call by Gompers and colleagues to disentangle the relative 
importance of investment selection and value adding. In our setting, superior investment 
selection by specialized investors is unlikely. Biotechnology firms applying for venture 
capital at start-up show no systematic differences in terms of management experience, alliance 
capital, stage and scope of the technology and market orientation, which are all early signals 
of firm potential. Important differences between the portfolio companies of specialized versus 
non-specialized investors only become apparent at the beginning of the development stage, 
approximately three years after founding. This finding is remarkably consistent with Maurer 
and Ebers (2006), who argue that biotechnology firms have quite similar social capital 
configurations during the start-up phase, but exhibit very different routes with respect to how 
they develop and manage their social capital from the development phase onwards. 
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An important consideration is whether evolutionary trajectories in the financing 
process are limited to our research setting. We believe our findings relate to a broader set of 
entrepreneurial firms for multiple reasons. Biotechnology entrepreneurs are typically 
scientists who have limited financing experience. This may constrain their search for 
financing. However, prior empirical research indicates that entrepreneurs of small technology 
based firms are typically less familiar with financing sources commonly used to fund growth, 
such as venture capital financing, compared to traditional financing sources, such as internal 
finance and bank debt (Van Auken, 2001). Furthermore, biotechnology entrepreneurs 
typically have strong ties with universities and research institutes, making them more likely to 
attract financing from funds related to those institutions. However, it remains remarkable that 
biotechnology entrepreneurs only search startup financing from those investors with whom 
they have close ties. Practitioner contributions in leading biotechnology journals, such as 
Nature Biotechnology, stress the importance of the source of financing and indicate that 
financing decisions within the biotechnology context are decisions of heightened importance 
(Greene, 1999). So, if even in this setting entrepreneurs limit their search for financing then 
what should we expect from entrepreneurs in the average “mom and pop” business where 
financing decisions are thought to be less critical? Indeed, the concept of local search in the 
search for financing corresponds with the stylized fact that the majority of entrepreneurs start 
with financing from family and friends (Berger & Udell, 1998). Although we briefly touched 
the question of generalizability of our case study evidence, we leave it up to theory testing 
research to determine whether our ideas survive empirical test. 
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), teleological models of the 
financing process, such as the static trade-off theory and pecking order theory, have advanced 
our knowledge about the financing process immensely. However, much remains unknown 
about the financing process and current frameworks are not able to explain all stylized facts 
on financial decision making (Frank and Goyal, 2005). Current frameworks also seem to have 
difficulties in explaining observations in organizational studies, such as the impact of initial 
differences in financing on the subsequent financing process and firm development. It was our 
purpose to show how we might further advance our knowledge by using a different theoretical 
lens, such as an evolutionary theory.  
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This study contributes to management practice by improving entrepreneurs’ 
understanding about the financing process. Entrepreneurs should balance the pressure of 
running out of cash and the time needed to search for appropriate sources of financing. Cash 
may be king in the biotechnology sector, but from whom you get the money may be far more 
important as it influences the ease with which the firm is able to attract follow-on financing. 
All this is essential, as inadequate financing decisions at startup can limit the future growth 
potential of a firm. Entrepreneurs should realize that not all private equity investors are the 
same. Not all private equity investors have the same value added potential and inappropriate 
decisions about which private equity investor to attract as a shareholder can hamper the future 
growth of the firm.  
Our results are important for VCFs as well. First, non-specialized VCFs sporadically 
contributing capital to biotech firms may question their current investment strategy. Given the 
required expertise and network structure to guide young biotechnology firms, it might be a 
better strategy for generalist investors to only act as a non-lead investor in a syndicate. We do 
note that in particular cases when large amounts of financing are needed, specialized VCFs 
invite generalist investors to join an investment syndicate. Second, VCFs should realize that, 
even if they are specialized in a specific sector, such as biotechnology, they do not have 
access to the entire range of investments. The entrepreneurs search for financing is typically 
local. Consequently, active deal origination remains an important mechanism to increase the 
supply of proposals of sufficient quality and diversity. 
Finally, government policy may benefit from our research findings. Currently, 
government agencies are primarily focusing on programs to increase the supply of financing 
for especially innovative and growing companies. Because of the finance constrained setting 
in which biotechnology firms operate in Europe, the biotechnology sector has received 
particular attention. One potential avenue for government is to contribute funds to local 
venture capital funds. However, an important insight for government officials is that the 
impact of venture capital on a firm’s growth path is not uniform. Specialized local venture 
capital funds with investment teams dedicated to biotechnology firms, which are well linked 
in the broader financial community, may be critical for local biotechnology firms to gain 
access to large amounts of international and specialized private equity financing. 
Consequently, contributing government funds to non-specialized venture capitalist funds may 
only marginally contribute to the development of the biotechnology industry or may even 
harm the development of this industry. 
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TABLE 1 
Theoretical Sampling Procedure a, b 
 
MARKET 
SENTIMENT ORIGIN FIRM 
LOW PERFORMING 
 FIRMS 
HIGH PERFORMING 
FIRMS 
HOT MARKET  
(1999-2000) ACADEMIC Pharmaleads  Theraptosis 
ACADEMIC Entomed, (Myosic) AC Pharma 
CORPORATE Irogen, (Myosic) Genom 
COLD 
 MARKET  
(2001-2003) 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE I-Zyme Aptanomics 
 
a Note that all cases are Flemish biotechnology firms active in R&D. This allows to (partially) control for other contextual 
factors such as location, institutional and cultural environment and financing need. 
 
b
 The names of the firms are disguised to guarantee anonymity. 
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TABLE 2 
Description of Biotechnology Cases Studied 
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Ex
it 
High Performing Firms 
Theraptosis 2000 Therapeutics 23 3 33 691 9,848 17 3 600 28,800 IPO 
(2007) 
AC Pharma 2002 Platform technologies 
and therapeutics 
12 2 10 
(2005) 
4,081 2,248 
(2005) 
19 2 4,500 6,740 Trade 
Sale 
(2006) 
Genom 1999 Platform technologies 
and therapeutics 
18 16 67 4,550 119,559 10 2 6,000 29,400 IPO 
(2005) 
Aptanomics 2001 Platform technologies, 
diagnostics and 
therapeutics 
18 6 59 6,207 29,285 22 4 63 70,060 IPO 
(2007) 
Low Performing Firms 
Pharmaleads 2000 Therapeutics (later 
transferred to spin -off) 
and platform 
technologies 
14 5 3 604 81 0 2 1,100 2,600 No 
Entomed 2002 Platform technologies 13 1 4 536 657 2 2 469 854 No 
Myosic 2003 Diagnostics 7 1 3  
(2005) 
1,140 894 
(2005) 
0 1 1,500 1,500 Failure 
(2006) 
Irogene 2002 Therapeutics 14 4 N.A. 371 31 0 1 350 350 No 
I-Zyme 2002 Industrial and 
environmental 
7 N.A. N.A. 101 18 0 1 63 63 No 
 
Source: financial accounts, interviews, European Patent Office and company websites 
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TABLE 3 
Sources of Data Biotechnology Cases 
 
 Interviews: 
Case 
Entrepreneurs 
Follow-up 
Entrepreneurs Investors 
Archival Documents: 
High Performing Firms 
Theraptosis CEO (2 
interviews) 
2 Investor  
B, D & G 
Detailed yearly financial accounts, statutory required publications, 
press releases, prospectus, slides management road show 
AC Pharma CEO (2 
interviews) 
- Investor  
B & D 
Detailed yearly financial accounts, statutory required publications, 
press releases, confidential reports private equity investor 
Genom CEO 1 Investor  
F 
Detailed yearly financial accounts, statutory required publications, 
press releases, (slides) presentation CEO at Belgian Biotechnology 
Association, (slides) presentation CFO at university seminar 
Aptanomics CEO and 
Business 
Developer 
- Investor  
F & H 
Detailed yearly financial accounts, statutory required publications, 
press releases, (slides) presentation CEO at Belgian Biotechnology 
Association 
Low Performing Firms 
Pharmaleads CEO and CSO - Investor  
D & G 
Detailed yearly financial accounts, statutory required publications, 
press releases 
Entomed CEO (2 
interviews) 
- Investor  
C & I 
Detailed yearly financial accounts, statutory required publications, 
press releases, internal university reports 
Myosic CEO 1 Investor  
A & E 
Detailed yearly financial accounts, statutory required publications, 
press releases, initial business plan, confidential reports private 
equity investor 
Irogene CEO (2 
interviews) 
- - Detailed yearly financial accounts, statutory required publications, 
press releases 
I-Zyme CEO 1 - Detailed yearly financial accounts, statutory required publications, 
press releases 
 
Total Number: 
(excl. pilot 
interviews) 
 
15 
 
5 
 
9 
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TABLE 4 
Financing Process by Type of Investor and Firm Performance  
 
Type of investor and financing round in which they participated a: 
Ca
se
 
 
 
Academic 
VCFs 
Bank VCFs 
Other non- 
specialized 
VCFs  
BAs 
Parent 
company/ 
institute 
Local 
Specialized 
VCFs 
International 
(Specialized)  
VCFs 
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High Performing Firms 
Theraptosis 1,2,3 2, 3 3 - - 2,3 2, 3 600 28,800 
AC Pharma 1,2 1,2 - - - 1,2 - 4,500 6,740 
Genom - - - - 1 - 2 6,000 29,400 
Aptanomics - 4 - - - 1,2,3,4 2,3,4 62 70,060 
Low Performing Firms 
Pharmaleads 1,2 2 - - - - - 1,100 2,600 
Entomed 2 - 1, 2 2 - - - 469 854 
Myosic 1 - - - 1 - - 1,500 1,500 
Irogene - - - - 1 - - 350 350 
I-Zyme - - - - 1 - - 62 62 
 
a The numbers in bold indicate financing rounds that occurred before the main data collection (the initial interviews). The 
numbers in italics indicate financing rounds that occurred afterwards. All cases were monitored in real time up until the end 
of 2007. If the cases raised new financing from private equity investors, we would have noticed this in the statutory required 
publications or financial statements which firms are obliged to complete. 
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TABLE 5 
Early Signals of Growth Potential and Firm Quality: Alliance Capital, Technology and 
Target Market * 
 
Alliance capital at startup   Technology at startup 
C
a
se
 
Commercialization 
activities 
Technical 
development 
activities  
R&D with 
universities or 
research institutes   
Stage in product 
development 
cycle Technology scope  T
a
rg
et
 
m
a
rk
et
 
a
t s
ta
rt
u
p 
High Performing Firms 
Theraptosis 0 0 2  Idea Phase 4 Niche market 
AC Pharma 0 0 0  Proof of concept 1 Mainstream market 
Genom N.A. N.A. 0  Idea Phase 5 N.A. 
Aptanomics 1 0 1  Proof of concept 5 Mainstream market 
Low Performing Firms 
Pharmaleads 0 0 1  Proof of concept 4 Niche market 
Entomed 0 0 0  Concrete market-
ready product 
2 Niche market 
Myosic 0 0 1  Idea Phase N.A. Niche market, move to 
mainstream market later 
Irogene 0 1 1  Idea Phase 5 N.A. 
I-Zyme 0 0 1  Proof of concept 5 Niche market, move to 
mainstream market later 
 
Source: Structured interviews research-based start-ups. 
* N.A. indicates that data was not available for the case. Technology scope at founding was measured on a five-point scale 
with 1= focus on one specific product and 5 = very broad technology platform with several applications. 
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TABLE 6 
The Impact of the Social Context on Initial Financing  
 Facts Illustrative Quotes 
Theraptosis University spin-off getting financing from university fund. 
Did not look for other potential equity investors. 
 
"It was the logical choice in the case of a spin-off." 
AC Pharma University spin-off getting financing from university fund.  
Genom Corporate spin-off getting financing from parent company 
Did not look for other potential equity investors. 
 
"The CEO did not need to look for money, it was provided by the 
two parent companies" 
Aptanomics Aptanomics raised financing from a specialized investor. 
This specialized investor has financed nearly all spin-offs 
from the research institute. 
 
Pharmaleads University spin-off getting financing from university 
funds. 
Tried to obtained bank financing unsuccessfully. No other 
equity investor looked for besides the university fund 
"It is the norm for spin offs from universities to start talking to the 
seed funds of universities. With the university fund we had the 
most obvious link." 
“No independent venture capital fund would have accepted to give 
funds because they only favor later stage companies. BAs would 
have been a possible alternative, but the company did not need to 
contact BAs because it received funds from the university fund.” 
 
Entomed Entomed's CEO contacted a university professor he knew. 
There was a friendship between the university professor 
and the senior investment manager of the initial investor. 
Relied solely on university professor to locate a financing 
source. 
 
 
Myosic Corporate/University spin-off getting financing from a 
corporate fund and university fund. 
No other equity investors considered 
"When searching for funding it appeared to be logical to have 
resources from the investors with whom the company and 
entrepreneur already had contacts." 
Irogene Corporate spin-off getting financing from parent company. 
Tried to attract financing from banks unsuccessfully. Tried 
to attract financing from a small number of investors, 
besides the mother company, but was unsuccessful. 
 
"Contacts were first initiated with a university seed fund. When 
they were not willing to invest the parent company provided 
financing." 
I-Zyme Spin-off getting start-up financing from research institute. 
Did not look for other potential equity investors. 
"The institute had the idea to spin-off the company and was 
therefore willing to invest. Afterwards, there were some contacts 
with business angels, but not more, things did not get any further." 
 
